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The rules governing a court's interpretation of a statute should depend
heavily on where that court is situated within the judicial institutional
framework. The varying degrees of interpretive deference that should be
shown to federal agencies by federal courts and state agencies by state courts is
demonstrative of this proposition. In Chevron, the Supreme Court mandated
that a federal agency's interpretation of a statute be shown judicial deference
when Congress had not spoken directly on the issue and the agency
interpretation was based on a reasonable construction of the statute Among
the many factors the Court cited in justifying this allocation of interpretive
power were the comparative political accountability of executive branch
entities, the formal distinction between the role of the courts and agencies in
the legislative process, and the technical expertise of agencies as compared to
courts. These justifications, however, are much less convincing in defining the
1. Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under Chevron,
courts are tasked with performing a two-step analysis. First, the evaluating court must ask
whether Congress specifically addressed the question at issue. If so, that is the end of the
matter. If not, then the court must ask whether or not the agency's interpretation is
reasonable, an extremely deferential standard. See Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot:
Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 199
(1992). Though Chevron is now more than a quarter of a century old, it still yields
significant power at the federal level: "in cases where Chevron was the deference regime
invoked by the [Supreme] Court, the agency w[ins] 76.2% of the time .... " William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of
Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEo. L.J. lO83,1122 (2008).
2. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (arguing that it is possible that when Congress leaves gaps in
statutes, it "consciously desire[s] the Administrator to strike the balance at th[e agency]
level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for
administering the provision would be in a better position to do so").
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optimal relationship between state courts and state agencies with respect to
interpretive deference. As such, while in many cases some level of deference
may be appropriate, state agencies should not be shown Chevron-like deference
by state courts when interpreting state statutes.'
State courts have not uniformly adopted the Supreme Court's approach in
Chevron. In fact, several state courts have rejected outright the idea of granting
strong deference to state agencies' statutory interpretations. The most recent
decisions of state high courts addressing the issue indicate that only sixteen
states have opted to give strong, Chevron-like deference to state agencies'
interpretive efforts.4 On the opposite end of the deference spectrum, fourteen
state judiciaries have announced they have no intention to defer to the
interpretive opinions of state agencies, choosing instead to decide those
questions de novo. s Eighteen states currently split the difference, granting
agencies "due deference" or some other form of measured respect when
appraising agencies' interpretive acts. 6
3. Whether or not "state courts' deference to state agencies' interpretation of state law" should
mirror the deference required in Chevron at the federal level remains "an open question" that
has not been robustly addressed in the literature to date. Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism
in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in Pharmaceutical Cases in State Versus Federal Courts, is
J.L. & POL'Y 1013, 1036 n.76 (2007).
4. Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi,
Montana, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. Michael Pappas, No Two-Stepping in the Laboratories: State Deference Standards
and Their Implications for Improving the Chevron Doctrine, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 977, 1010-
24 (20o8); see, e.g., Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Ademaj, 243 S.W.3d 618, 623 (Tex. 2007)
("Construction of a statute by [an] administrative agency charged with its enforcement is
entitled to serious consideration, so long as the construction is reasonable and does not
contradict the plain language of the statute." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
5. Alaska, California, Delaware, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. Pappas, supra note 4, at
lolo-24; see, e.g., Hirneisen v. Champlain Cable Corp., 892 A.2d 1056, 1059 (Del. 2006) ("A
reviewing court may accord due weight, but not defer, to an agency interpretation of a
statute administered by it. A reviewing court will not defer to such an interpretation as
correct merely because it is rational or not clearly erroneous.").
6. Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri,
New Jersey, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas,
and Wisconsin. Pappas, supra note 4, at loio; see, e.g., Sandusky Dock Corp. v. Jones, 834
N.E.2d 786, 789 (Ohio 2005) ("[W]e will give due deference to the director's reasonable
interpretation of the legislative scheme governing his agency." (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Louisiana is unaccounted for in the catalogue of state Chevron cases because of its
civil law system, and South Dakota has also been omitted due to a lack of available cases. For
a thorough discussion of which states show what level of deference to state agency
interpretations, as well as an accompanying discussion of the stated reasons for granting
that particular level of deference, see Pappas, supra note 4, at lOO-24.
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While the states have not adopted a uniform approach to agency deference,
most states share common attributes that, this Comment argues, justify
denying state agencies Chevron-like deference on Chevron's own terms. State
judges are in most cases more directly politically accountable than state agency
officials and federal judges due to their necessary involvement in electoral
politics. State courts also have a long, rich history of engaging in common law
making that state agencies and federal courts do not, making them well-suited
to fill statutory gaps independently. Finally, deference based on technical
expertise is less warranted at the state level due to the typical subject matter of
state agency action.
I. THE POLITICAL NATURE OF STATE JUDGES
The assertion that agencies' interpretive efforts should be afforded
deference at the federal level because they are more democratically accountable
than the courts lacks validity at the state level. State court judges are in most
instances more politically accountable than state or federal agency
decisionmakers, and certainly more accountable than federal judges. In twenty-
one states, judges are elected at the outset by popular vote. 7 In thirty-eight
states, judges are subject to some form of retention election regardless of
whether they obtain office initially by election or appointment, holding them
directly accountable for the decisions they make on the bench to the electorate.
8
In ten of the twelve states lacking direct judicial electoral accountability,
judicial performance is reviewed periodically by the state legislature or
7. Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. In the remaining states,
judges are initially appointed under a merit system or by the state governor. Am. Judicature
Soc'y, Methods of Judicial Selection: Selection of Judges, http://www.judicialselection.us/
judicial-selection/methods/selection-ofjudges.cfm (last visited Sept. 20, 2009). Although
some of these elections are officially nonpartisan, political parties and political action groups
have the ability to campaign in each instance. Eric Helland & Alex Tabarrok, The Effect of
Electoral Institutions on Tort Awards, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 341, 343 (2002). While this
discussion deals only with selection and retention of the judges of a state's highest court, in
most cases, similar practices are employed throughout the state judicial system. For a
comprehensive description of the electoral status of state judges at all levels, see Am.
Judicature Soc'y, supra.
8. This figure includes both states in which judges are subject to retention elections and
reelection. In a retention election, a judge runs unopposed based solely on their record. A
judicial reelection is a competitive, partisan, political race. Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 7,
at 343.
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executive.9 Judicial rulings escape periodic political scrutiny by either the body
politic or other branches of the government in just two states.'" In contrast to
agency officials, who are typically appointed and retained by an elected
executive, and federal judges with life tenure, state judges are in many cases
held directly accountable to the people of the state for their judicial actions."
State judges possess many additional political attributes that federal judges
and state agency heads do not, beyond the mere fact that they are elected.
Federal judges obtain life tenure positions through a process that does not
penetrate particularly deeply into their policy views. Federal and state agency
heads' policy views are formally put through the crucible just once during the
confirmation process. In the case of state judges, important policy issues are
often brought to their attention through the campaigning process and can play
a dispositive role in whether or not judges are ultimately elected.
Additionally, when facing questions of statutory interpretation, state judges
"are more likely than their federal counterparts to know what the issues of
public debate were when state legislation was proposed, what the state
legislature thought it was doing when it passed the legislation, and what the
situation in the State was before and after that legislation was passed."'2 By
9. Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, New York, South
Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia. In Hawaii, an independent commission conducts the
review. Am. Judicature Soc'y, supra note 7.
1o. In New Hampshire, judges serve after appointment until age seventy. In Rhode Island, state
judges are appointed to life terms. Id.
11. Noting this fact, some scholars have commented that "state judges are significantly more
vulnerable to the influence of the majority than are their federal counterparts." John Dayton
& Anne Dupre, Blood and Turnips in School Finance Litigation: A Response to Building on
Judicial Intervention, 36 J.L. & EDUC. 481, 489 (2007). In almost every state, all but the top
five executive positions are appointed. Colorado, for example, elects the Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Secretary of State, and the Treasurer; all other
executive officers are appointed. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF STATE GOVERNMENT: PEOPLE,
PROCESS, AND POLITICS 246-48 (Margaret R. Ferguson ed., 2006) (detailing which executive
positions are elected or appointed in Colorado).
12. Marcia L. McCormick, Mhen Worlds Collide: Federal Construction of State Institutional
Competence, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1167, 1198 (2007). The fact that state judges are held
directly accountable to the electorate in many states has both practical and theoretical
implications for their interpretive roles, as compared to federal judges. There is a very
interesting strand of scholarship arguing that judges should update statutes in accordance
with political preferences. Regardless of the general utility of these ideas, it would seem
their implementation would be much more appropriate at the state level where judges are
held politically accountable directly than at the federal level where judges are intentionally
insulated from politics. See GUIDO CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2,
6-7, 82, 100-04, 163-66 (1982); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 167-70 (1994); RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 231 (1995); T.
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comparison, federal judges are politically insulated to a much greater extent.
Because they are removed from the electoral process, federal judges can often
"ascertain current political preferences only from a cold record of legislative
action." 3 They serve life terms, are not removable except under extraordinary
circumstances, and have salaries that cannot be lowered."4 If state court judges
miscalculate what is democratically desirable then they can be held
democratically accountable by the electorate much the same as a legislator or
executive. State judicial elections "routinely feature intense competition, broad
public participation, and high salience," drawing the important political issues
of the day into the fore.'" To the extent that having a democratically
accountable authority interpreting certain statutes is desirable, as Chevron
implies is appropriate in certain situations, state judges are likely better suited
for the task than federal judges and state agency officials.
II. THE COMMON LAW ORIGINS OF STATE COURTS
While the political accountability justification alone is enough to raise
significant doubts about applying Chevron's logic at the state level, there are
other legitimate reasons that state courts should interpret statutes
independently. The distinction between the roles of courts and agencies in the
legislative process cited in Chevron'6 holds far less sway at the state level than at
the federal level. State legislatures have historically relied on courts to fill in the
Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 21-22, 46-61
(1988); Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REv.
2027, 2129 (2002); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, loi YALE L.J. 331, 390-91 (1991); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L.
REV. 1165, 1166-73 (1993).
13. Elhauge, supra note 12, at 2129. Beyond the fact that they are appointed as opposed to
elected, it is entirely possible that federal judges are influenced by their political beliefs and
political party affiliations. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006) (examining how prior political
affiliation correlates with judicial outcomes). Political influence based on one's prior beliefs,
however, is in no way unique to the federal judiciary and is probably at best sporadically
correlated with the type of political accountability at issue in Chevron.
14. U.S. CONST. art. III, S 1.
15. David E. Pozen, The Irony ofJudicial Elections, io8 COLUM. L. REv. 265, 265 (2008).
16. 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) ("Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either
political branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing
political interests, but not on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast,
an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the
limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise
policy to inform its judgments.").
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legal and practical gaps left by the legislative process in a way that Congress
has not.17 With respect to state courts' ability to make law through interpretive
efforts, "state legislatures not only accept such judicial decisionmaking as
entirely legitimate, but also expect that within defined boundaries courts will
make such choices."1 This attitude may be reflective of the fact that state
courts are better suited than federal courts to engage in quasi-legislative
processes due to their common law origins.
The paradigmatic example of state courts making law occurs in the realm of
torts. By judicially defining the boundaries of socially acceptable conduct
through tort verdicts, state courts regularly engage in policymaking with
effects similar to those of a legislative act.19 While federal courts primarily
decide issues based on statute and precedent, state courts often rely exclusively
on their own policy perceptions." Viewed from this perspective, state courts
have a far higher level of institutional competency than federal courts with
respect to engaging in common law making.2" State courts' common law
competencies make them uniquely qualified to definitively interpret statutes
and fill legislative gaps in a way that the federal courts are not.
III. THE EXPERTISE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
AGENCIES AND OTHER PRACTICAL CONCERNS
The significant differences between the responsibilities of state and federal
agencies further undermine the applicability of Chevron-like deference at the
state level. There is less reason for state court deference to state agencies for
technical reasons because the issues state agencies deal with are, on the whole,
less technically complicated. Federal courts must deal with issues stemming
17. See Judith Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading
Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 34 (1995).
18. Id.
19. See Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American
Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 849 (1978); Burt Neuborne, Foreword: State
Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 2o RUTGERS L.J. 881, 896-97 (1989).
20. Such important issues include disputes about torts as well as choice of law, standing, and
the admissibility of evidence. See Barbara C. Salken, To Codify or Not To Codify- That Is the
Question: A Study of New York's Efforts To Enact an Evidence Code, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 641, 641
(1992).
a. Adam N. Steinman, "Less" is "More"? Textualism, Intentionalism, and a Better Solution to the
Class Action Fairness Act's Appellate Deadline Riddle, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1183, 1223 n.z48 (2007)
("The tradition of common law policy-making by state courts arguably gives them greater
leeway when interpreting a state statute than federal courts (which lack broad authority to
make common law) have when interpreting a federal statute.").
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from statutory interpretations rendered by agencies like the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, and the
Food and Drug Administration that can be substantively challenging due to
their scientific and technical nature.22 By way of comparison, many state
agencies are concerned with solely domestic matters like public safety and
family services.23 While the problems that state courts encounter on this front
may be no less difficult from a factual or legal perspective, most states do not
have agencies analogous to those existing at the federal level that deal with
complex scientific issues that may be beyond the grasp of liberally educated
judges7 4
In addition to the fact that Chevron's deferential rationale does not apply at
the state level on its own terms, there are numerous practical considerations
suggesting that state courts would be justified in independently interpreting
state statutes." A reasoned measure of agency deference is appropriate at the
22. See, e.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 339 (2002)
("[T]he subject matter here is technical, complex, and dynamic; and as a general rule,
agencies have authority to fill gaps where the statutes are silent.").
23. For example, the State of Ohio has created agencies and departments by statute to deal with
the following issues: agriculture, commerce, development, education, employment, family
services, health, natural resources, public safety, rehabilitation and correction, taxation,
transportation, and veterans affairs. See State of Ohio Government Agencies,
http://www.ohio.gov/agencies (last visited Sept. 20, 2009).
24. Additionally, there may be a smaller difference between the ability of judges and that of
agency officials to deal with what technical issues do arise at the state level than there is at
the federal level, lessening the need for interpretive deference. To the extent that wages
correlate with skill within a given profession, as labor market economics postulates, the
disparity in compensation provided to state and federal agency employees indicates that
federal agency interpretations might deserve greater deference than their state analogs based
on technical expertise. Managerial officials at federal agencies generally seem to earn about
fifty percent more than their state counterparts. Compare U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., Salary
Table No. 20o8-EX (Jan. 20o8), http://www.opm.gov/oca/o8tables/html/ex.asp (federal),
with MARK SHEPARD, HousE RES. DEP'T, STATE AGENCY HEAD SALARIES (2008),
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/ss/ssagsal.pdf (Minnesota). Additionally,
although expertise can theoretically inform decisionmakers about the likely consequences of
a given interpretation, even in theory it cannot resolve which statutory interpretation has the
best policy implications. Such ultimate resolution depends on political preferences about
how to weigh those consequences. See Elhauge, supra note 12, at 2038.
2S. Some of these practical issues may have constitutional implications. Chevron, at some level,
may aggrandize the political opinion of the executive over the legislative branch. See
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 864-65
(2001) (summarizing arguments that Chevron can be seen as a possible source of separation
of powers and nondelegation norms). Ensuring that the judiciary retains independent
interpretive power may be useful in helping to maintain a desirable balance of power
between the state executive and legislature.
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federal level because allowing individual federal courts to arrive at their own
interpretations of federal statutes would result in a disparate patchwork of law
emanating from the same statutory source.26 This is less of a concern with
respect to state law since the state's highest court can issue a unifying and
authoritative interpretation of a state statute-at least in the intra-state sense. It
is also possible that deference at the state level is less appropriate than at the
federal level because state agencies may be more susceptible to non-democratic
regulatory capture.2 7 The threat of capture is greatest when an agency regulates
a small group with limited interests,s a situation much more common within
the states than at the federal level. In this case, it is more important that an
independent interpretive analysis occur at the state level than in federal courts.
Furthermore, many states have codified canons of statutory construction,2 9
potentially resulting in less ambiguity ex ante about how statutes should be
interpreted and, therefore, less need for deference to an agency's reading of a
statute.
CONCLUSION
State judges should not give deference to the statutory interpretations of
state agencies based on the justifications offered in Chevron. While state judges
are only elected in twenty-one states, they are held directly politically
accountable for their actions in thirty-eight states. Under the rationale of
Chevron, federal agency officials are better suited to interpret the statutes they
administer because they are held politically accountable ex post, not because
they were selected by a political process ex ante. As such, more than two-thirds
of state judiciaries are more politically accountable than the agencies found to
be sufficiently politically accountable to warrant deference in Chevron. In all but
two of the remaining states, judicial performance is at least reviewed by the
26. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power To Say What the Law Is, 115
YALE L.J. 2580, 2597 n.79 (2oo6).
27. SUSAN ROSE-AcKERmAN, RETHINKING THE PROGREssIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE
AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 159-73 (1992); Jerry L. Mashaw & Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Federalism and Regulation, in THE REAGAN REGULATORY STRATEGY ill (George C. Eads &
Michael Fix eds., 1984); see also THE FEDERALIST No. lo (James Madison) (arguing that
state governments may be more susceptible to factional influences than the national
government).
28. Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public
Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 169-70 (1990).
29. See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2oo), available at http://digitalconmmons.law.yale.edu/ylsspps-papers/32.
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state executive or legislature, making state judges in those states at least as
accountable as the vast majority of state and agency officials. With these
findings in mind, Chevron deference is not warranted based on political
accountability concerns in the thirty-eight states in which judges are held
directly accountable to the electorate. To the extent that Chevron is appropriate
at the federal level based on political accountability concerns, its use may be
justifiable in the two states in which judges have life tenure as well. In the
remaining ten states in which judicial performance is reviewed only by other
government actors, the political accountability argument is not dispositive,
requiring an assessment of other factors to determine the doctrine's
applicability in those states.
Political accountability considerations aside, the origins of state courts and
the nature of state regulatory efforts argue for the rejection of Chevron-like
deference in all states. Most state courts originated from, and grew within, a
deeply rooted common law tradition much stronger than that of the federal
judicial realm. Since state judicial bodies regularly engage in common law
making, these state institutions are uniquely qualified to fill statutory gaps in a
way that federal courts and state agencies are not. Regardless of the electoral
accountability of a state's judges, concerns about technical competence and
decisional uniformity are less relevant at the state than federal level. 30
While Chevron's reasoning does not support state court deference to state
agency statutory interpretations based on the reasons Chevron offers, there are
other more measured deference doctrines that can be validly transferred from
the federal court-agency relationship to the state court-agency dynamic.
Deference doctrines grounded in respect for the executive and legislative
branches of the government provide illustrative examples. For example, state
courts would be justified in mimicking federal courts' behavior with respect to
agencies' statutory interpretations when the state legislature has expressly
30. Currently, there is not a high level of correlation between whether or not the members of a
state court are elected and the level of deference that a court gives to agencies' statutory
interpretations. Cross-referencing the information about the electoral aspects of state courts
and whether or not they utilize Chevron deference reveals that only one-third of the state
judiciaries that are held directly democratically accountable refuse to show deference to state
agencies' interpretive efforts. More specifically, of the thirty-eight states that hold their
judiciaries accountable by popular vote, twelve state courts grant Chevron deference, sixteen
implement some form of intermediate deference, and ten review agency interpretations de
novo. In terms of percentages, these numbers are not strikingly different from courts where
the judges are not held democratically accountable: five of these state courts show Chevron-
like deference, three some intermediate form of deference, and four conduct de novo review.
Compare Pappas, supra note 4, at loio-24, with Am. Judicature Soc'y, supra note 7.
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delegated lawmaking authority on that topic to the agency." Under this same
rationale, it is appropriate for state courts to defer to state agencies'
interpretations of their own regulations unless they are "plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation."32 In a manner analogous to a federal court's
extreme deference to the executive's interpretation of treaties, it may also be
appropriate for state courts to give deference to state executives' interpretations
of interstate compacts.
33
In addition to doctrines based on respect for the legislative and executive
branches of government, there are other specific doctrines used when federal
courts interpret federal statutes that can be appropriately applied in state
courts. State courts would likely be justified in showing state agency statutory
interpretations Skidmore-like deference, granting state agency statutory
interpretations respect to the extent that they have the "power to persuade," as
this doctrine is based simply on the individual arguments presented in a given
case and not some broader deferential principle.34 There are many different
jurisprudential theories that can justify state court deference to a state agency's
interpretive acts, but in most cases, the theory articulated in Chevron is not one
of them.
D. ZACHARY HUDSON
31. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005);
Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 88-89 (199o). This scenario is complicated by the fact that
whether or not Congress has expressly delegated an agency lawmaking authority is itself an
issue of statutory interpretation. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255 (2006).
32. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); see Comm'r v. Schleier, 515
U.S. 323, 336 (1995); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
33. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 356 (2006); El Al Isr. Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng,
525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999). Due to the nature of interstate compacts, these issues will
infrequently appear in state courts. See New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767 (1998).
34. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see also Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 255-56;
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-28 (2001). Skidmore deference is similar in
many respects to the "due deference" standard currently in use in seventeen states. See
Pappas, supra note 4, at lO1O-24. As a corollary, states would be similarly justified in
adopting the reasoning applied in federal courts that agency interpretations in constant flux
or that are underdeveloped wield minimal persuasive power. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe
Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 65-66 (2006).
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